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BEYOND MONETARY COMPENSATION: 
THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE 
SERVICES FOR THE WRONGFULLY 
CONVICTED 
Jennifer L. Chunias 
Yael D. Aufgang* 
Abstract: Twenty-two states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal 
Government currently have statutory mechanisms in place to provide 
compensation for wrongfully convicted individuals. Most of these statutes 
focus on the need for monetary compensation for individuals who have 
spent years in prison for crimes they did not commit. Only three of these 
statutes also provide meaningful post-release services. This is despite the 
fact that these programs are critical to address the unique reentry obsta-
cles that face wrongfully convicted individuals and to ensure successful re-
integration into society. This article examines the need for all states to 
provide meaningful post-release services to wrongfully convicted indi-
viduals. Focusing on the Massachusetts statute—the first compensation 
statute to include a meaningful services provision—the authors also assert 
that non-monetary “compensation” should include reentry services im-
mediately upon release that are at least comparable to those received by 
parolees, but yet are tailored to the distinct needs of wrongfully convicted 
individuals. 
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Introduction 
 Over the past several years, there has been a considerable increase 
in the number of individuals who have been exonerated of the crimes 
for which they were wrongfully convicted.1 This has included over 200 
individuals since 1983 who have had their actual innocence demon-
strated through DNA testing.2 Despite the fact that individual states 
have played at least a substantial contributing role in each of these 
wrongful convictions,3 currently fewer than half of the states in this 
country have any mechanism to provide compensation to these exon-
erees for the years they were wrongfully incarcerated.4 Other authors 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 523, 527 (2005) (“The rate of exonerations has increased sharply over 
the fifteen-year period of this study, from an average of twelve a year from 1989 through 
1994, to an average of forty-two a year since 2000.”). 
2 Innocence Project, News and Information: Fact Sheets, http://www.innocencepro- 
ject.org/Content/351.php# (last visited Jan. 28, 2008). To date, there have been 212 ex-
onerations in the United States based on DNA testing. Id. 
3 As used in this article, the term “wrongful conviction” refers to the conviction of in-
dividuals who have either pled guilty to, or have been tried and found guilty of, criminal 
charges, who are in fact innocent. As used herein, the term does not refer to individuals 
who have committed crimes, but were convicted under constitutionally defective proce-
dures. The authors also refer to “wrongfully convicted” individuals who have been released 
and “exonerees” interchangeably, although readers should note that in practice there may 
be legal distinctions between these two terms. 
4 Currently, twenty-two states, plus the District of Columbia, provide a mechanism for 
monetary (and, in some cases, other) compensation. These states are Alabama, California, 
Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Ala. Stat. §§ 29-2-150 to-165 (2001); Cal. Penal 
Code §§ 4900–4906 (West 2001); D.C. Code §§ 2-421 to -425 (2007); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
505/8(c) (2004); Iowa Code Ann. § 633A.1 (West 1997); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:572.8 
(2005); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 8241 (1993); Md. Code Ann., State Fin. & Proc. § 10-
501 (West 2003); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2004); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 650.055(9) 
(2005); Mont. Code Ann. § 53-1-214 (2003); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 541-B:13–:14 (2003); 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:4C1–:4C6 (West 1997); N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8-b (McKinney 2007); N.C. 
Gen. Stat. §§ 148-82 to-84 (2001); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2305.02, 2305.49, 2743.48 (Lex-
isNexis 2003); Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 154 (2003); Tenn. Code. Ann. § 9-8-307 (2007); Tex. 
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 103 (Vernon 2001); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5574 (2007); W. 
Va. Code § 14-2-13a (1987); Wis. Stat. § 775.05 (1988). Montana’s compensation statute 
mandates that wrongfully convicted individuals are entitled to receive educational aid at the 
state’s expense (but no monetary compensation). Mont. Code Ann. § 53-1-214 (2003). In 
addition, the federal government also provides compensation for wrongful conviction, with 
damages not to exceed $100,000 per twelve-month period of incarceration for any plaintiff 
who was sentenced to death and $50,000 for each twelve-month period for any other plain-
tiff. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2007). 
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have conducted comprehensive examinations of the obligation—if not 
legal, then at the very least moral—of every state to provide a statutory 
mechanism for the compensation of wrongfully convicted individuals.5 
As early as 1914, legal scholars in this country argued that just as all 
members of our society share a common interest in “maintaining the 
public peace by the prosecution of crime . . . the loss should be borne 
by the community as a whole and not by the injured individual alone.”6 
Scholars have also documented why state compensation statutes are 
necessary in light of the inadequacy of the other legal alternatives that 
are available for individuals who have been wrongfully convicted and 
later exonerated.7 The two other primary legal avenues—bringing a 
lawsuit either in tort or under civil rights statutes, or drafting a private 
bill and attempting to have it introduced into the state legislature—are 
much more challenging, time-consuming, and expensive, and more 
often than not are unsuccessful.8 
 Even in the minority of states that do have compensation statutes, 
these mechanisms are excessively restrictive in identifying who will be 
compensated, and cap the amount of recovery at artificially low levels.9 
                                                                                                                      
 
5 See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate Indi-
viduals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 Drake L. Rev. 703 (2004) 
[hereinafter Bernhard, Justice Still Fails] (criticizing states’ inaction in creating generous 
compensation schemes); Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Con-
viction, 6 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 73 (1999) (arguing that more states should enact 
comprehensive statutes). 
6 Edwin M. Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 52 Annals Am. Acad. 
Pol. & Soc. Sci. 108, 110 (1914) (noting that “practically every country in western Europe 
[has] elaborate statutes governing this subject” and questioning why the United States 
should “lag behind any longer”); see also Joseph H. King, Jr., Compensation of Persons Errone-
ously Confined by the State, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1091, 1092 (1970) (arguing that “erroneous 
confinements are costs of operation to be borne by the system”); J.H. Wigmore, Editorial, 
The Bill to Make Compensation to Persons Erroneously Convicted of Crime, 3 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 665, 665–67 (1913) (advocating the moral obligation to compensate the 
wrongfully convicted). 
7 See, e.g., Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, supra note 5, at 732–34 (documenting the legal 
hurdles a wrongfully convicted individual faced). 
8 See id. 
9 See, e.g., 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/8(c) (2004). For instance, the Illinois compensa-
tion statute for unjust imprisonment requires that the imprisoned person receive a pardon 
from the Governor on the grounds of innocence, and the awards are capped at $15,000 
for five years or less, $30,000 for imprisonment of five to fourteen years, and no more than 
$35,000 for more than fourteen years imprisonment. Id. Under the New Hampshire stat-
ute, if a majority of the Board of Claims finds that the claimant is “innocent of the crime 
for which he was convicted” and that “the payment to a claimant is justified,” the claimant 
 
 
108 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:105 
Moreover, these statutes generally have not addressed the need for 
post-release services for exonerees, who encounter a host of unique 
and complicated long-term, non-monetary problems as a result of their 
wrongful incarceration, but are generally simply set free after years of 
imprisonment without any systemic assistance.10 
 In 2004, Massachusetts became the first state to create a compensa-
tion statute that provides a mechanism for post-incarceration services 
(through the state or otherwise) in addition to monetary compensa-
tion for wrongfully convicted individuals upon release.11 The Massa-
chusetts statute not only provides for monetary compensation up to 
$500,000, but it also allows courts to grant, in their discretion, “state 
services that are reasonable and necessary to address any deficiencies in 
the individual’s physical and emotional condition” as a result of his or 
her erroneous “conviction and resulting incarceration.”12 Exonerees 
are also entitled to a fifty percent tuition reduction at any state com-
munity college or university.13 
 This article will focus on the need for all states to provide mean-
ingful services to wrongfully convicted individuals, both to compensate 
them for the non-monetary injuries they have suffered as a result of 
their incarceration, and to assist their successful reintegration into soci-
ety. It will argue that monetary compensation is not enough, and will 
suggest why all states should embrace the spirit of the Massachusetts, 
Louisiana, and Vermont compensation statutes by also providing com-
                                                                                                                      
 
can receive a maximum of $20,000, regardless of the number of years of wrongful impris-
onment. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 541-B:13–:14 (2003). 
10 See, e.g., 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/8(c) (2004) (failing to provide exonerees with 
post-release services). 
11 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2004). In 2005, Louisiana enacted a compensa-
tion statute that provides services such as job skills training for a year, medical and counseling 
services for three years, and state educational aid for five years. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 15:572.8 (2005). In addition, in 2007 Vermont passed a compensation statute that provides 
up to ten years of eligibility for the Vermont Health Access Plan using state-only funds, and 
compensation “for any reasonable reintegrative services and mental and physical health care 
costs incurred” between “the release from mistaken incarceration and the date of the award.” 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5574 (2007). Like the Massachusetts statute, Louisiana and Vermont 
provide services to exonerees in addition to capped amounts of monetary compensation. See 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:572.8 (2005); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2004); Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 13, § 5574 (2007). In contrast, Montana provides post-release services, allowing for 
ten years of educational aid, but does not award any money to the exoneree. Mont. Code 
Ann. § 53-1-214 (2003). 
12 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2004). 
13 Id. 
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pensation in the form of services.14 In addition, it will explain why 
states have an obligation to provide reentry services for wrongfully con-
victed individuals immediately upon release. Like other prisoners, for 
whom the most critical time periods for the transition to life outside of 
prison are the “moment of release” and the time period immediately 
following release,15 an exoneree’s experience in the very first days, 
weeks, and months following release will strongly influence whether he 
or she is able to successfully reenter and reintegrate into society. Yet, 
ironically, these individuals generally are not even provided with the 
equivalent social services that are currently provided to individuals who 
were guilty of the crimes for which they were incarcerated. Because 
wrongfully convicted individuals generally are not “qualified” or appro-
priate for the post-release systems that are in place for parolees, exon-
erees likely will not receive any transitional services upon release at all. 
In addition, because of the time it takes to pursue their legal compen-
sation claims, exonerees generally will not receive any monetary com-
pensation until months or years after release. Given this, even if exon-
erees knew how to access necessary services upon release, they would 
lack the financial means to do so. Moreover, even if pre-release reentry 
planning assistance were available to exonerees (generally it is not), as 
a practical matter, exonerees generally have insufficient advance notice 
of their release to take advantage of these programs. 
 Part I of this article will address the reentry plight of wrongfully 
convicted individuals. As compared with the extensive analysis that has 
been conducted regarding the reentry issues of guilty prisoners upon 
release, the data that has been compiled regarding the effects of prison 
on the reintegration experiences of wrongfully convicted individuals is 
largely anecdotal. We know from these powerful accounts, however, 
that the impact of prison life on inmates who are in fact innocent of the 
crimes for which they have been convicted and imprisoned is, in at least 
some respects, even more detrimental. This article will provide exam-
ples of how the impact of prison in the most basic areas—psychological 
health, job opportunities, housing, and physical health—is further 
                                                                                                                      
 
14 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:572.8 (2005); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) 
(2004); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5574 (2007). 
15 Jeremy Travis et al., From Prison to Home: The Dimensions and Consequences 
of Prisoner Reentry 18 (2001), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from_ 
prison_to_home.pdf. 
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compounded by the lack of appropriate pre- and post-release services 
for exonerees, as compared with other prisoners. 
 Part II of this article will examine the particularities of the Massa-
chusetts compensation statute and discuss experience to date with its 
provisions, most specifically, the services component.16 The Massachu-
setts statute’s services provision is a meaningful step towards providing 
wrongfully convicted individuals with the services and support that are 
necessary to give these individuals a true chance at successful reentry 
into society, and should set the bar for other state compensation stat-
utes.17 In addition, however, states should recognize their responsibility 
to assist in a more comprehensive fashion with the reintegration of 
wrongfully convicted individuals, to provide reentry services immedi-
ately upon release, and to address reintegration issues in a manner that 
is specifically geared towards the distinctive obstacles that face wrong-
fully convicted individuals. 
I. Reentry Plight of the Wrongfully Convicted 
 In addition to financial problems they face after being released 
from prison, wrongfully convicted individuals also encounter a host of 
unique and complicated non-monetary obstacles upon their release.18 
To date, these issues have gone largely unaddressed by existing com-
pensation mechanisms.19 This is despite the fact that the impact of 
prison life on inmates who are actually innocent is even more detri-
mental than for other prisoners. While incarcerated individuals who 
are guilty face well-documented obstacles to successful reentry, wrong-
fully convicted individuals endure even more onerous circumstances 
                                                                                                                      
 
16 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2004). Unlike the Louisiana compensation 
statute, the Massachusetts statute does not limit an exonerated person’s right to receive 
services to a certain pre-determined duration. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:572.8(C)(3)(b) 
(2005) (limiting payment of “necessary medical and counseling services” to three years); 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2004). Rather, the court may order that Massachusetts 
exonerees receive necessary services based on evidence presented in each individual 
claimant’s case. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2004). As the Vermont statute only 
became effective very recently (in July 2007), there is not yet sufficient evidence from 
which the authors are able to fully examine the legislation’s strengths and weaknesses. See 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5574 (2007). 
17 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2004). 
18 See King, supra note 6, at 1097 (noting that persons recently released from prison 
have trouble finding employment). 
19 See Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, supra note 5, at 704–06. 
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upon release.20 This part provides an overview of some of the detri-
mental impacts of incarceration on an individual’s psychological 
health, job opportunities, housing, and physical health. It also identifies 
certain factors which suggest that the post-release experiences of exon-
erees in each of these areas are worse than that of other former prison-
ers. 
 In general, there are no state or federal systems in place to support 
the reentry of exonerees immediately upon release, and, ironically, 
most wrongfully convicted individuals are not even entitled to the social 
services that are provided to released convicts who were guilty.21 In any 
event, the state systems that are in place for probationers or parolees 
are entirely inappropriate for wrongfully convicted individuals. Tradi-
tional reentry programs are premised on the notion that the partici-
pants committed crimes for which they were properly convicted and 
served their time.22 In addition, these programs are focused on success-
ful reintegration as a means of, among other things, curbing recidivism 
rates.23 For exonerees, on the other hand, post-release services should 
be provided both as a means of ensuring successful reintegration and as 
part of an effort to “make whole” exonerees who have been injured by 
errors in the administration of the criminal justice system that led to 
their wrongful conviction. While the categories of problems that face 
wrongfully convicted individuals upon release—such as mental health 
problems, lack of education and job training, lack of suitable housing, 
and physical health problems—may be the same as those that face 
other former prisoners, the nature of the issues faced by wrongfully 
convicted individuals upon release are distinct and must be addressed 
in a way that is sensitive to their specific needs. 
 Moreover, although most wrongfully convicted individuals would 
likely qualify for public assistance, including access to housing, food 
                                                                                                                      
 
20 “Reentry,” defined as “leaving prison and returning to society,” carries with it a host 
of obstacles, both physical and mental, societal and personal. Travis et al., supra note 15, 
at 1. 
21 See generally Shawn Armbrust, When Money Isn’t Enough: The Case for Holistic Compensa-
tion of the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 157, 175–76 (2004) (recounting the 
experience of David Shepard, an exoneree who served eleven years in prison for a rape he 
did not commit and who was turned away from four agencies that served ex-offenders 
because of his innocence). 
22 See Travis et al., supra note 15, at 14 (stating that parole boards have traditionally 
released prisoners who have rehabilitated themselves). 
23 Id. at 6–8. 
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stamps, and possibly job and vocational training, immediately upon re-
lease, most exonerees are unaware of these programs or their entitle-
ment to such services, do not have the skills necessary to navigate these 
systems on their own, and may be too embarrassed to ask for help. 
While properly convicted individuals generally receive state-provided 
assistance in accessing appropriate public services and setting up reen-
try plans prior to their release, most wrongfully convicted individuals 
are simply, and often suddenly, set free.24 
A. Psychological Impact of Incarceration 
What has he suffered? . . . He is psychologically scarred for life. He will al-
ways suffer from the core symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. As well, 
he will always suffer from paranoia, depression and the obsessive desire to 
clear his name. His reputation as a murderer has affected him in every as-
pect of his life, from work to family relations. . . . His reputation as a mur-
derer will follow him wherever he goes.25 
1. Prison Experience 
 Studies of the prison environment and its effects on those living 
within it demonstrate that, although each individual will react differ-
ently to incarceration, incarcerated persons generally suffer long-term 
consequences from having been subjected to pain, deprivation, and 
extremely atypical patterns and norms of living and interacting with 
others.26 “Institutionalization” (also referred to as “prisonization”) is 
the process that occurs throughout the adjustment to life in prison, and 
is often used as shorthand for the negative psychological effects of im-
prisonment.27 Through this process, prisoners develop a dependence 
                                                                                                                      
 
24 See Interview with Lawyer Johnson, in Boston, Mass. ( June 29, 2007) (on file with 
authors). Lawyer Johnson was initially sentenced to death and spent ten years in prison for 
a murder he did not commit in Massachusetts, before he was released in 1982. Id. He 
analogizes the release process to the experience of a freed slave. Id. “It is like setting a slave 
free without the means to be free: a mule, food, shelter or the means to build shelter, no 
means to remain free and survive.” Id. 
25 Elizabeth F. Loftus, Memory in Canadian Courts of Law, 44 Canadian Psychol. 207, 
207 (2003) (quoting Commissioner Peter Corey describing the post-exoneration life of 
Thomas Sophonow). 
26 Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for 
Post-Prison Adjustment 79 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 
410624_PyschologicalImpact.pdf. 
27 Id. at 80. 
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on institutional structures as a result of the very strict rules and limita-
tions imposed in a prison environment.28 The consequences of this 
process are often difficult to reverse after release from prison, particu-
larly for those who have been incarcerated for long periods of time or 
since a young age.29 
 Prisons also have an informal inmate code to which prisoners must 
conform.30 This culture typically discourages meaningful emotional 
expressions and any signs of vulnerability or weakness.31 This “code” 
may promote a culture of hypermasculinity in male prisons “in which 
force and domination are glorified as essential components of personal 
identity.”32 As a result, prisoners often develop “hypervigilance,” be-
coming distrustful of fellow inmates and causing some individuals to 
develop aggressive strategies to avoid victimization.33 Due to the con-
stant threat, actual and perceived, from other inmates and prison 
guards, prisoners also develop emotional control strategies.34 
 The prisonization process may cause some prisoners to withdraw 
socially, exhibiting behavior closely resembling that of people suffering 
from clinical depression.35 Developing a flat affect and withdrawn be-
havior may help prisoners cope with prison life.36 Prisoners describe a 
diminished sense of self-worth after living in a prison environment.37 
The deprivation of privacy rights, feelings of infantilization, and degra-
dation may cause prisoners to internalize the stigma and “compro-
mised social status” resulting from incarceration.38 
 Finally, the experience of incarceration may manifest as a form of 
post-traumatic stress in some prisoners.39 According to the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, symptoms of post-traumatic 
                                                                                                                      
 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 80–81. 
30 Id. at 82. 
31 Haney, supra note 26, at 83. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 81. 
35 Id. at 82. 




114 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:105 
stress may include difficulty sleeping due to recurrent nightmares, 
hypervigilance, irritability or anger, and difficulty concentrating.40 
 For exonerees, the psychological impact of imprisonment is fur-
ther compounded by the fact of having been incarcerated for crimes 
that they did not commit.41 In 1984, Dennis Maher, who was then a ser-
geant in the U.S. Army, was wrongfully convicted of two rapes (one in 
Lowell, Massachusetts, and one in Ayer, Massachusetts) and one assault 
with intent to rape (in Lowell), based on mistaken victim identifica-
tions, and sentenced to life in prison.42 Maher was exonerated in 2003 
through DNA testing, after spending nineteen years in prison.43 Maher 
recounts countless nights in which he has been tormented by night-
mares of prison.44 Beyond the memories of prison, Maher has the 
added fear of being wrongfully convicted again.45 
 Maher also identifies institutionalization as one of the most serious 
psychological effects of prison he experienced and observed during his 
wrongful incarceration.46 According to Maher, inmates—even those 
who are innocent of the crimes for which they were convicted—who 
enter prison young or without a well-formed identity are most suscepti-
ble to the effects of institutionalization.47 Maher credits the regimented 
life he led before conviction as an army sergeant, his strong familial 
relationships, and the job he held in the staff grill at the Treatment 
Center of the Old Colony Correctional Center in Bridgewater, Massa-
chusetts, where he was incarcerated, with minimizing some of the ef-
fects of institutionalization.48 Because of his job as a cook and the hours 
it required, Maher was not “locked into every count” and, thus main-
tained a schedule and responsibilities similar to those of people on the 
outside.49 
                                                                                                                      
 
40 Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders, 309.81 (4th ed. 1994). 
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2. Upon Release 
 Release from prison is not always a joyous occasion, as it is often 
accompanied by feelings of anxiety about such things as family, em-
ployment, and finances.50 Studies of prisoner reentry have concluded 
that the “moment of release,” and the hours and days immediately fol-
lowing release, are critical to the transition to life outside of prison.51 It 
has been suggested that policy reforms addressing the anxieties atten-
dant to release from prison for properly convicted individuals could 
“reduce the risk of recidivism . . . and improve the odds of successful 
reintegration after release.”52 Adjusting to life outside of prison is made 
even more difficult when former prisoners are stigmatized and ostra-
cized by their communities.53 
 The abruptness with which exonerees are released only com-
pounds the trauma that comes along with the drastic change of reen-
tering society.54 While parolees and inmates who have served out their 
sentences expect release and are provided with reentry services in ad-
vance to prepare for it, exonerees are often released suddenly upon a 
judicial decision in their favor.55 According to exoneree Lawyer John-
son, who was wrongfully convicted of murder, after fighting for years to 
prove his innocence and secure his release, living outside of prison was 
at times so difficult that he would commit minor offenses, like shoplift-
ing, in order to spend the night in prison when he was feeling particu-
larly overwhelmed with life on the outside.56 
 During his years in prison, Johnson had developed a strategy of 
isolation as a coping mechanism—what Johnson calls his “wall.”57 
Learning to depend on himself alone was a way to survive and to shield 
himself from the violence of prison and anger of being wrongfully con-
victed.58 Release was akin to being thrown from one extreme to an-
other—from a strictly enforced structure and complete lack of freedom 
                                                                                                                      
 
50 Travis et al., supra note 15, at 18. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 19. 
53 Dina R. Rose & Todd R. Clear, Incarceration, Reentry and Social Capital: 
Social Networks in the Balance 10 (2002). 
54 See Interview with Lawyer Johnson, supra note 24. 
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and privacy in prison, to no structure, total freedom, and true isolation 
on the outside.59 When released, Johnson “took the wall” with him— 
this wall of distrust and of fear that the horror of wrongful conviction 
could happen again.60 
 Once out of prison, without the proper support, Johnson remem-
bered prison as an environment in which he knew how to function, a 
place to “reboot” —despite the horrors that came along with it.61 Tragi-
cally, Johnson had developed a serious drug habit while in prison, a 
habit that he did not have before his wrongful conviction.62 Thus, petty 
crime after his release both helped to support his drug addiction and 
provided him with the occasional reprieve from the unstructured world 
he had grown to distrust and fear.63 
 Johnson is not alone in his post-exoneration experience. For ex-
ample, Neil Miller was convicted in 1990 in Boston, Massachusetts for 
aggravated rape, based almost entirely on the eyewitness testimony of 
the victim.64 He was exonerated in 2000 through DNA testing.65 Miller 
tells a similar story, not only about the pressure and shock of release, 
but of the anger attendant to having served nine-and-a-half years for a 
crime he did not commit: 
There are days that I am so angry and get so nervous being on 
the train around a bunch of people that I wish I could go up-
stairs to my cell, close my door, and lock in. That is what I used 
to do whenever things got too hectic and did not make me feel 
right. I was so used to being able to close the cell door.66 
B. Employment 
 Prisoners, as a group, have lower levels of education and literacy 
than the rest of the population. For instance, according to a 2003 Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics report, only thirteen percent of the prison and 
jail population had any post-secondary education, as compared to forty-
                                                                                                                      
 





64 Neil Miller, Reflections of the Wrongly Convicted, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 615, 619 (2001). 
65 Id. at 615. 
66 Id. at 620. 
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eight percent of the general population.67 Such educational deficien-
cies, particularly when combined with minimal or no prior or recent 
work experience that results from long periods of incarceration, make 
attaining meaningful employment particularly difficult for prisoners 
upon release.68 Compounding these factors is the fact that employers 
are hesitant to hire employees with criminal records.69 
 Many states offer work-release programs to help prepare prisoners 
for the transition to work upon release.70 In Massachusetts, for instance, 
inmates become eligible for a work-release program up to eighteen 
                                                                                                                      
 
67 Caroline Wolf Harlow, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Education and Correc-
tional Populations 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf. 
68 Harry J. Holzer et al., Employment Barriers Facing Ex-Offenders 7 (2003), 
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410855_holzer.pdf. 
69 Id. at 8. 
70 States vary in their commitment to transition, and due to the large number of pris-
oners being released each year, some states have begun to experiment with different pro-
grams to assist in the release process. In fact, during the 2004 State of the Union address, 
President George W. Bush recommended committing $300 million over four years for 
funding of programs focusing on reentry issues—an initiative that received bipartisan sup-
port and seems to have inspired action by state legislatures, as well. See Michael Pinard, An 
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues 
Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 623, 649 (2006) (citing President 
George W. Bush, State of the Union Address ( Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://www.white 
house.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html). 
The pre-release center in Montgomery County, Maryland, organizes meetings between 
inmates and parole and probation officers during incarceration so that plans can be de-
veloped before the critical moments of release. Marta Nelson & Jennifer Trone, Why 
Planning for Release Matters 2 (2000), available at http://vera.org/publication_pdf/ 
_for_release.pdf. The center offers many other services, including family counseling, to 
prepare inmates for release. Id. A secure transitional facility was created in 1996 by the 
Maryland Department of Correction to which some prisoners may move eighteen months 
before release. Id. The facility provides vocational training, domestic relations classes, ses-
sions with victims to discuss the impact of crime, job readiness training, and psychological 
counseling. Id. 
Similarly, Texas developed a state program called the Serious and Violent Offender 
Reentry Initiative Program “designed to reduce recidivism by better preparing and assist-
ing offenders . . . to successfully reenter their communities.” Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Jus-
tice, Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative Program, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/ 
pgm&svcs/pgms&svcs-serious-offender-pgm.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). The program 
consists of two phases: phase I involves in-cell training with programming provided on a 
computer six to seven months before release covering anger management, substance 
abuse, employment, and more; phase II starts upon release into supervision and continues 
the care. Id. In order to be eligible, inmates must have, among other things, a minimum of 
ten months before release. Id. 
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months before scheduled release.71 The inmate will work full-time dur-
ing this period.72 After certain deductions, the earned income is placed 
into the inmate’s account and turned over to him or her upon re-
lease.73 In addition to state services, there are non-profit organizations 
in Massachusetts that have contracts with state government agencies to 
provide work preparation assistance to ex-offenders.74 For example, 
Span, Inc., in conjunction with the Massachusetts Department of Cor-
rection, Parole Board, and the Board of Probation, offers work readi-
ness classes and reintegration counseling to former inmates.75 
 Exonerees, however, may not have the benefit of preparation for 
release while in prison, and so are unlikely to have the opportunity to 
participate in work-release or other programs geared towards reentry. 
For them, the process is often unpredictable and the release experi-
ence abrupt. As a result, the wrongfully convicted are generally left 
without even the benefits provided by the states to the properly con-
victed who have served out their sentences. Even after exoneration 
and release, most exonerees’ criminal records are not automatically 
expunged and, thus, continue to reflect the wrongful conviction and 
remain visible to potential employers.76 Ironically, then, exonerees do 
not receive the work preparation assistance provided to ex-offenders 
or the advantage of having a clean criminal record. Even where a state 
compensation statute does provide for the expungement or sealing of 
records, there will still be a significant gap in the exoneree’s employ-
ment history that will require explanation.77 
 Dennis Maher expresses frustration at the lack of support for ex-
onerees at the critical moment of release.78 When first exonerated, 
                                                                                                                      
 
71 H.I.R.E. Resources and Assistance, http://www.hirenetwork.org/admin/clearing 
house.php?state_id=MA (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. (listing several non-profit agencies that prepare ex-offenders to work). 
75 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Citizens’ Guide to State Services, http://www.sec. 
state.ma.us/cis/ciscig/f/f24f28.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). 
76 See, e.g., Hearing on H.B 1053, H.B. 1543, H.B. 1569, and H.R. 255 Before H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2007–2008 Leg., 91–93 (Pa. 2007) (statement of Andrew Hoover, 
Legislative Assistant, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Pa.) (expressing outrage that Pennsyl-
vania did not automatically expunge the criminal records of exonerated individuals). 
77 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D § 5(A) (2004) (providing, after a separate hear-
ing, that persons exonerated in Massachusetts may have records of their erroneous convic-
tion expunged or sealed). 
78 Interview with Dennis Maher, supra note 41. 
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Maher recalls, he did not receive many of the services provided to pa-
rolees.79 However, Maher had one advantage that many exonerees do 
not—he had received vocational training during high school and then 
worked as a mechanic in the military.80 Upon release, he was able to get 
a job as a mechanic with a reputable company that took him in, under-
stood his story, and has since embraced his cause.81 Unfortunately, this 
story is rare among exonerees, many of whom leave prison with little or 
seriously interrupted work history and without marketable job skills. 
C. Housing 
 Like finding employment, finding housing frequently presents 
challenges for the recently released. For recently released prisoners 
who have the option to live with relatives, the effort to find housing can 
be delayed. However, returning to a family home, in the same 
neighborhood with the same connections that one had before entering 
prison, may not be the optimal situation for a successful reentry. Gen-
erally, prisoners without post-release housing plans receive assistance 
from the State as a component of their reentry planning program. For 
instance, in Massachusetts, inmates without plans for post-release hous-
ing are referred to housing specialists at the Reentry Services Division 
of the Massachusetts Department of Correction six months before 
scheduled release.82 Specialists will conduct initial assessments and then 
develop housing plans for the inmates, considering housing prefer-
ences and potential barriers to housing, as well as the community-based 
services that may be needed by the individuals.83 Former inmates move 
into their housing immediately upon release and are guided by hous-
ing specialists for up to six-months during the stabilization period.84 
During this time, specialists will conduct home visits and mediate the 
landlord-tenant relationships when necessary.85 





82 Mass. Executive Office of Pub. Safety, Reentry Housing Program Overview, available 
at http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=eopshomepage&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Eeops (follow 
“Prisons” hyperlink under “Law Enforcement & Criminal Justice”; then follow “Reentry & 
Reintegration” hyperlink; then follow “Reentry Housing Program Overview” hyperlink) 
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 Securing long-term housing is often even more challenging for 
exonerees. Without advance notice of upcoming release, exonerees 
generally do not receive the benefits of services like the ones provided 
by the Reentry Services Division of the Massachusetts Department of 
Correction.86 Moreover, because their criminal records are not auto-
matically expunged upon exoneration, they will most likely be unable 
to secure affordable housing on their own.87 Immediately upon re-
lease, exonerees who do not have family or friends to stay with are 
forced to seek housing at a homeless shelter. 
D. Physical Health 
1. Prison Effects 
 Serious, life-threatening diseases are significantly more prevalent 
among the prison population than among the general population in 
the United States.88 According to the Department of Justice, as of the 
end of 2004, the rate of confirmed AIDS diagnoses in prison (both fed-
eral and state) was more than three times that of the general popula-
tion.89 The statistics are similar for tuberculosis (TB) and hepatitis C. 
Approximately two percent of the American population is infected with 
hepatitis C, a viral disease that attacks the liver and is spread through 
infected blood.90 In stark contrast to that statistic, it is estimated that 
approximately thirty percent of the residents of correctional institu-
tions are infected with the disease.91 Though only 0.7% of the United 
States population was incarcerated in prisons and jails in 2003, 3.2% of 
                                                                                                                      
 
86 See id. (summarizing the services the Executive Office of Public Safety provides to 
incarcerated individuals who are able to anticipate and plan for their release). 
87 See Caterina Gouvis Roman & Jeremy Travis, Where Will I Sleep Tomorrow? Housing, 
Homelessness and the Returning Prisoner, 17 Housing Pol’y Debate 389, 397 (2006). Re-
leased prisoners may not be eligible for subsidized housing because of laws prohibiting 
persons convicted of certain crimes from receiving subsidized housing. Id. 
88 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HIV in Prisons 5 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.us- 
doj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/hivp04.pdf (noting the prevalence of HIV in prisons). 
89 Id. 
90 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Viral Hepatitis C, http://www.cdc.gov/Nci- 
dod/diseases/hepatitis/c/plan/HCV_infection.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). 
91 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hepatitis Testing and Treatment in State Prisons 1 
(2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/httsp.pdf (reporting statistics 
about incarcerated individuals with hepatitis C). 
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the nation’s TB cases occurred in prisoners.92 The close living quarters 
and overcrowding of correctional facilities contribute to the risk of 
transmission of TB.93 
2. Upon Release 
 Prisoners generally receive assistance from the State in determin-
ing whether they are eligible for public medical assistance upon release 
and in applying for these benefits, as part of a comprehensive reentry 
plan. For instance, in Massachusetts, inmates are provided with assis-
tance applying for health insurance within sixty days of their scheduled 
release through the Department of Correction’s MassHealth Initia-
tive.94 “The goal of the Department of Correction is to have everyone 
who is eligible to have a MassHealth card in their hand upon release.”95 
A correctional program officer will work with an inmate to fill out a 
MassHealth application and, after it is screened for accuracy, will en-
sure that it is sent to the MassHealth Central Processing Unit.96 The 
Reentry Services Division tracks and monitors the application from 
start to finish.97 
 Despite the fact that many exonerees are released with significant 
medical issues as a result of having been incarcerated, and without any 
means of obtaining health care, these reentry services are not routinely 
provided to exonerees. Instead, it is incumbent upon each exoneree to 
navigate the system and determine how to apply for and receive public 
assistance benefits on his or her own. Without this assistance, exonerees 
                                                                                                                      
 
92 Jessica R. MacNeil et al., An Unanswered Health Disparity: Tuberculosis Among Correc-
tional Inmates, 1993 Through 2003, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health 1800, 1800 (2005). 
93 Id. 
94 Mass. Executive Office of Pub. Safety, How MassHealth Cases Are Processed, http:// 
www.mass.gov/?pageID=eopshomepage&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Eeops (follow “Prisons” hy-
perlink under “Law Enforcement & Criminal Justice”; then follow “Reentry & Reintegration” 
hyperlink; then follow “How MassHealth Cases are Processed” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 2, 
2008). 
95 Mass. Executive Office of Pub. Safety, DOC Goal Concerning MassHealth, http:// 
www.mass.gov/?pageID=eopshomepage&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Eeops (follow “Prisons” 
hyperlink under “Law Enforcement & Criminal Justice”; then follow “Reentry & Reintegra-
tion” hyperlink; then follow “DOC Goal Concerning MassHealth” hyperlink) (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2008). 
96 Mass. Executive Office of Pub. Safety, How MassHealth Cases Are Processed, supra 
note 94. 
97 Id. 
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without significant support from friends, relatives, or attorneys are 
unlikely to access the medical care needed upon release from prison. 
II. Statutory Compensation in Massachusetts 
A. Overview 
 To date, most of the compensation mechanisms for wrongfully 
convicted individuals, as well as the debates regarding justification for 
compensating exonerees, have focused on their entitlement to finan-
cial compensation. Existing state compensation statutes vary widely with 
respect to their mechanisms for recovery, the amount of compensation 
they provide, and the legal standard that must be applied to determine 
whether an individual is entitled to recovery, as well as who has author-
ity over the claims.98 For the most part, state compensation statutes pro-
vide for either an administrative or judicial remedy. Massachusetts was 
the first state with a statutory mechanism entitling exonerees to mean-
ingful services as a component of their compensation award, in addition 
to the statutorily mandated maximum monetary compensation.99 
 According to local practitioners who have represented several of 
the individuals who have received awards under the Massachusetts stat-
ute, the most significant shortcoming relates to the practical implica-
tions of contemplating post-release services as part of a judicial judg-
ment.100 While the need for reentry services for exonerees—like the 
                                                                                                                      
 
98 For instance, the New Hampshire statute caps an exoneree’s potential recovery at 
$20,000, see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-B:14 (2003), the Tennessee statute authorizes an 
award up to $1,000,000, see Tenn. Code. Ann. § 9-8-307 (2004), while the New York statute 
does not put a dollar limit on damages, stating only that if the claimant is successful the 
court will award an amount of damages it “determines will fairly and reasonably compen-
sate” the claimant. N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8-b (McKinney 2007). 
99 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2004). 
100 Interview with Robert Feldman, Partner, Birnbaum & Godkin, LLP, Boston, Mass. 
( June 27, 2007) (on file with authors); Interview with Howard Friedman, Attorney, The 
Offices of Howard Friedman, P.C., in Boston, Mass. ( June 8, 2007) (on file with authors). 
As of August, 2007, nine exonerees had received awards under the Massachusetts compen-
sation statute: Stephen Cowans, Donnell Johnson, Lawyer Johnson, Dennis Maher, Neil 
Miller, Marvin Mitchell, Marlon Passley, Eric Sarsfield, and Eduardo Velazquez. E-mail 
from Peter Sacks, Massachusetts Deputy Chief Attorney General, to Anna Froneberger, 
NEIP Paralegal (Aug. 10, 2007, 11:57:00 EST); E-mail from Peter Sacks, Massachusetts 
Deputy Chief Attorney General, to Anna Froneberger, NEIP Paralegal & Jennifer Chunias, 
Partner, Goodwin Proctor LLP (Aug. 10, 2007, 15:04:00 EST). At least twenty-two claims 
have been filed since the statute was enacted, and many are still pending. Id. Of the nine 
exonerees who have received awards to date, approximately three have received services 
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need for reentry services for other prisoners—is immediate, it may take 
many months or years to file and adjudicate a claimant’s entitlement to 
compensation. Other cited problems include the fact that any services 
awarded under the statute are to be provided exclusively by the State, 
and are limited to services that are currently provided by the State. As a 
result, the unique psychological and other needs of exonerees are likely 
to be unmet. 
B. The Massachusetts Compensation Statute 
 Pursuant to chapter 258D of the Massachusetts General Laws, a 
claimant may bring an action against the Commonwealth for an “erro-
neous” felony conviction, provided that the claimant has (1) received a 
full written pardon on the basis of innocence, or (2) been granted cer-
tain specified judicial relief (set forth below), and provided that, at the 
time of filing the compensation action, no criminal proceeding is 
pending or can be brought against the individual for any act associated 
with the felony conviction.101 The specified judicial relief that would 
qualify a claimant to seek relief is either (a) the judgment of the convic-
tion is vacated, reversed, and the indictment or complaint was dis-
missed, or (b) at a new trial the claimant was found not guilty or not 
retried or the case against the claimant was abandoned (nolle prosequi) 
with the accusatory instrument dismissed.102 If the claimant meets these 
requirements, he is entitled to bring an action against the State in the 
superior courts.103 
 At trial, the claimant has the burden of proving by “clear and con-
vincing evidence” that he qualifies as an erroneously convicted person 
as set forth above.104 The claimant is required to attach certified copies 
of the mittimus that shows his or her sentence to incarceration, and the 
pardon or certified copies of the records from the judicial action relat-
ing to his release.105 
                                                                                                                      
 
pursuant to the statute. Id. Some of the other six exonerees who have not yet followed up 
their initial request for services, but whose cases are still open, may also ultimately receive 
services through their statutory compensation award. Id. 
101 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 1(B) (2004). 
102 Id. 
103 Id.; see also § 3 (requiring claimants to bring their claims in the county where the 
they were convicted or in Suffolk County). 
104 § 1(C)(i). 
105 § 1(B). 
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 Also, the claimant must not have pled guilty to the felony for 
which he was convicted,106 must not have been serving any concurrent 
time for another crime,107 and must prove that he did not commit the 
felony charged (or any other felony arising out of or reasonably con-
nected) or any lesser included offenses.108 The claimant has the right 
to prove all these facts at a jury trial with relaxed standards of evi-
dence relating to issues such as any difference of proof caused by pas-
sage of time, death, or unavailability of witnesses.109 Should the Gov-
ernor revoke the pardon, the case is immediately dismissed.110 Service 
of process must be made on the Attorney General’s office; the Attor-
ney General then decides whether to oppose the claim.111 The Attor-
ney General is also granted authority to arbitrate or settle the claim, 
but any settlement greater than $80,000 needs approval by the Secre-
tary of Administration and Finance.112 However, settlement precludes 
other claims against the Commonwealth.113 
 If the claimant wins a verdict by meeting the burden of proof for 
the various elements, the claimant is entitled to compensation.114 The 
court or jury can consider any factors “deemed appropriate under the 
circumstances in order to fairly and reasonably compensate the claim-
ant,” including but not limited to the income he would have earned, 
the particular circumstances of his trial and other proceedings and 
the length and conditions under which he was incarcerated, with a 
limit of $500,000 and no punitive damages.115 
 In addition to monetary damages, the court may also require the 
Commonwealth to provide services to the claimant that are “reasonable 
and necessary to address any deficiencies in the individual’s physical 
and emotional condition that are shown to be directly related to the 
individual erroneous felony conviction.”116 To receive these services, 
                                                                                                                      
 
106 § 1(C)(iii). 
107 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 2 (2004) (denying claimants compensation for any 
part of the sentence served concurrently with another crime). 
108 § 1(C)(iv). 
109 § 1(F). 
110 § 2. 
111 § 4. 
112 Id. 
113 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 4 (2004). In the fall of 2007, the first case to proceed 
to trial under Chapter 258D resulted in a mistrial. 
114 § 5(A). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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the claimant must specifically plead the nature of the services required 
and the agencies in the Commonwealth that will provide them in the 
original complaint and prove the need for them at trial.117 An exon-
eree’s psychological or physiological issues relating to the individual’s 
experience while in prison (generally set forth in a separate affidavit 
that counsel may then seek to have impounded) may be considered in 
relation to damages and to necessary services.118 
 The court may also include a fifty percent tuition reduction at any 
state community college or university in the Commonwealth in the 
judgment.119 It is unclear whether the court can order the individual 
admitted to an educational institution, or whether the statute is in-
tended to provide only for tuition assistance once the individual has 
been admitted.120 The Massachusetts statute also provides, after a sepa-
rate hearing on the matter, for the expungement or sealing of records 
directly pertaining to the erroneous conviction.121 
C. Experiences With the Massachusetts Statute 
 Through the inclusion of a services component in its compensa-
tion statute, Massachusetts has implicitly recognized that the “loss 
[that] . . . should be borne by the community as a whole and not by the 
injured individual alone” is not limited solely to monetary damages.122 
Rather, it is the obligation of the states to attempt to make exonerees 
“whole” by also providing access to meaningful services to address the 
negative impacts of wrongful imprisonment on every aspect of their 
lives. In this regard, the Massachusetts statute should serve as a model 
for other states.123 
                                                                                                                      
 
117 Id. 
118 See id. (giving the court or jury broad discretion to consider any factors they deem 
relevant in awarding damages and services). 
119 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2004). 
120 See id. 
121 Id. As previously noted, the wrongfully convicted still face the problem of having to 
explain significant gaps of time in their employment and life histories. Exonerees who 
have already been compensated under the state compensation statute also report that 
their records will not be expunged as long as they have a federal civil rights case relating to 
their wrongful conviction pending. Interview with Lawyer Johnson, supra note 24; Inter-
view with Dennis Maher, supra note 41. It is often the case that exonerees will pursue re-
covery in both forums. 
122 See § 5(A); Borchard, supra note 6, at 110. 
123 See § 5(A). 
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 That being said, according to local attorneys who have represented 
several of the individuals who have received awards under the Massa-
chusetts statute, there are still some shortcomings relating to the ser-
vices component that need to be addressed. The most significant in-
adequacy relates to the practical implications of addressing the need 
for post-release services solely as a component of a judicial judgment or 
award.124 Attorney Howard Friedman, a civil rights attorney who has 
represented several of the exonerees who have received compensation 
under the Massachusetts statute, suggests that it is critical that exon-
erees also receive assistance from the State immediately upon release.125 
As with other prisoners, it is this initial reentry period that is most likely 
to determine whether an individual is going to be able to successfully 
reintegrate into society.126 But practically speaking, it may take months 
or years for an exoneree’s statutory compensation claim (including a 
claim for services to address specifically pleaded physical or emotional 
deficiencies) to make its way through the legal system to resolution.127 
In the meantime, exonerees generally do not receive the benefit of 
state-sponsored reentry services that, for parolees, may begin before 
release and continue after reentry into society.128 Exoneree services 
should include job and vocational training, mental health counseling, 
substance abuse programs, and assistance in obtaining housing and 
food stamps.129 
                                                                                                                      
 
124 Interview with Howard Friedman, supra note 100. 
125 Id. Mr. Friedman, of the Offices of Howard Friedman, P.C. in Boston, Massachu-
setts, has been a civil rights attorney for over thirty years, focusing much of his practice on 
police misconduct cases. Id. He has represented several of the exonerees who have re-
ceived awards under the Massachusetts statute in connection with their state compensation 
cases, and also represents exonerees in connection with federal civil rights lawsuits relating 
to their wrongful convictions. Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 The Massachusetts Department of Correction, in collaboration with the Massachusetts 
Parole Board, has established a Regional Reentry Initiative. “The goal is to provide links to 
the community especially in the areas of housing, mental health counseling, substance abuse 
counseling, and employment.” Mass. Executive Office of Pub. Safety, Regional Reentry Cen-
ter Initiative, http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=eopshomepage&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Eeops 
(follow “Prisons” hyperlink under “Law Enforcement & Criminal Justice”; then follow “Reen-
try & Reintegration” hyperlink; then follow “Regional Reentry Centers” hyperlink; then fol-
low “Regional Reentry Center Initiative” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). 
129 Although not technically a “service,” reentry assistance for exonerees should also 
include a monetary stipend adequate enough to tide them over for the first few months 
after their release. 
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 Unfortunately, simply making the reentry services that are already 
in place for parolees available for exonerees is not a viable solution. 
Prisoner reentry programs are largely inappropriate for individuals 
who are actually innocent of the crimes for which they were impris-
oned, because the programs are generally premised on the notion that 
participants were guilty of the crimes for which they were imprisoned. 
These programs are also often reminiscent of prison in their structured 
rules and strict curfews, which are presumably intended to increase the 
likelihood that parolees will not recidivate. Programs that are reminis-
cent of a prison environment are not appropriate for exonerees who 
were not properly incarcerated in the first place. Rather than being 
thrown back into an environment akin to prison, exonerees need a 
support system to assist them in developing the skills and trust neces-
sary to lead fulfilled lives. 
 In addition, although exonerees experience many of the same 
symptoms of “institutionalization” and other detrimental impacts of 
prison as other inmates, many of an exoneree’s needs and issues are 
completely distinct. Hence, so as not to inflict further injury upon the 
wrongfully convicted by forcing them into programs that are inappro-
priate and only serve to remind them of the strictures of prison life, 
reentry services for exonerees must be sensitive to the particular rein-
tegration issues and obstacles that face this population. 
 A related problem is the fact that the Massachusetts statute re-
quires that any services that are “awarded” to a claimant must be pro-
vided by the State.130 Likewise, the Commonwealth’s obligation to pro-
vide services to exonerees is limited to services that are already 
currently available, regardless of whether that leaves an exoneree’s par-
ticular needs unmet.131 
 Attorney Friedman also suggests that many of the services that will 
ultimately be “awarded” to exonerees through the compensation stat-
ute may be services that they are already entitled to through state pub-
lic assistance programs unrelated to incarceration.132 But without satis-
factory reentry services from the State, most exonerees do not know 
how to access this assistance upon release.133 
                                                                                                                      
 
130 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2004). 
131 See id. 
132 Interview with Howard Friedman, supra note 100. 
133 Id. For instance, although Dennis Maher and Lawyer Johnson were without income, 
health insurance, or housing of their own upon release, neither of them had any idea what 
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 Attorney Friedman and Attorney Robert Feldman, another local 
attorney who has represented several of the individuals who have re-
ceived or are seeking compensation under the Massachusetts statute, 
agree that currently there are not appropriate structures in place to 
facilitate the provision of appropriate reentry services.134 One solution 
would be for the Commonwealth to designate an exoneree case worker 
who would work directly with each exoneree from the moment of re-
lease, conduct a detailed intake interview, and locate appropriate ser-
vices for each exoneree. This person could be someone who is em-
ployed by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health or some 
other agency, and should be someone who is familiar with and could 
navigate the available systems and deal with exonerees’ needs on a case-
by-case basis. 
Conclusion 
 Wrongfully convicted individuals can never fully recover for the 
years they spent behind bars for crimes they did not commit. They 
should, nonetheless, be provided with reasonable monetary and non-
monetary compensation by the State that was responsible for the ad-
ministration of the criminal justice system that wrongfully imprisoned 
them. Non-monetary “compensation” should include reentry planning 
services immediately prior to and upon release that are at least compa-
rable to those received by other prisoners upon release, but yet are sen-
sitive and tailored to the distinct needs of exonerees. States should also 
provide wrongfully convicted individuals with long-term physiological, 
psychological, and other services necessary to address the detrimental 
impacts of imprisonment. These services are required to address the 
unique obstacles that wrongfully convicted individuals face upon reen-
try to life outside of prison, and to give them the tools they need to en-
able them to successfully reintegrate into society. 
                                                                                                                      
 
public assistance programs they might be eligible for or how to apply. Interview with Law-
yer Johnson, supra note 24; Interview with Dennis Maher, supra note 41. 
134 Interview with Robert Feldman, supra note 100; Interview with Howard Friedman, 
supra note 100. Attorney Robert Feldman is a partner at Birnbaum & Godkin, LLP in Bos-
ton, Massachusetts. He has represented several of the exonerees who have received awards 
under the Massachusetts statute in connection with their state compensation cases, and 
also represents exonerees in connection with federal civil rights lawsuits relating to their 
wrongful convictions. 
